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Casey: Judicial Interference with the NLRB

JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE WITH THE NLRB:
YESHIVA UNIVERSITY AND THE DEFINITION
OF "MANAGERIAL"
JANE CLARK CASEY*

20, 1980, the United States Supreme Court, in NLRB V.
Yeshiva University,' decided that the full-time faculty members of
Yeshiva University are managerial employees excluded from the coverage
of the National Labor Relations Act. The decision was an affirmation of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' and a rejection of the position taken
by the National Labor Relations Board.' This paper reviews judicial interN FEBRUARY

ference with National Labor Relations Board decision-making generally,

comments on the merits of the Yeshiva decision, and assesses the particular
significance of the Court's interference with the National Labor Relations
Board definition of "managerial."
I.

STATUTORY MANDATE

When Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,'
its expressed purpose was to "diminish the causes of labor disputes."5 The
responsibility for enforcement of the Act was confided to the National
Labor Relations Board,' with only limited provision for judicial review.'
Very early, the Supreme Court acknowledged and more extensively
articulated the purpose of the Act, the ills it was designed to eliminate,
and the importance of construing the statute liberally to accomplish its ends:
*Chief, Civil Actions Bureau, Cook County State Attorney's Office. At the time this article
was prepared, Ms. Casey was an Assistant Professor at John Marshall Law School, Chicago,
Illinois. The author would like to express her gratitude to Carol Brzyky for her assistance in
the preparation of this article.
2 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
2 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978).
s221 N.L.R.B. 169, 91 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1975).
4 National (Wagner-Connery) Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat.
449 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976). The Act was signed by President
Roosevelt on July 5, 1935.
549 Stat. 449 (1935).
8 Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 6(a), 49 Stat. 452 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976)).
The NLRB had actually been created by Executive Order No. 6763, June 29, 1934, pursuant to Public Resolution 44, 48 Stat. 1183 (1934). The same Executive Order abolished
the National Labor Board (the Wagner Board) appointed by the President on August 5,
1933. However, Congress first delegated responsibilities to the Board with the passage of
the Wagner-Connery Act.
The Act provided: "The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence,
shall be conclusive." Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 10(e) 49 Stat. 454, (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). Such limited review was not new with the NLRA. The Federal
Trade Commission had already been given the same protection from judicial interference,
and similar finality had been given to other administrative agencies through judicial construction. See Fraenkel, Judicial Interpretationsof Labor Laws, 6 U. Cm.L. RnV. 577, 595
(1938).
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The Act, as its first section states, was designed to avert the "substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce" which result from
"strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest" by eliminating
the causes of that unrest. It is premised on explicit findings that strikes
and industrial strife themselves result in large measure from the refusal of employers to bargain collectively and the inability of the
individual workers to bargain successfully ...
[I]t cannot be irrelevant that the particular workers in these
cases are subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the evils that statute
was designed to eradicate and that the remedies it affords are ap...

propriate for preventing them or curing their harmful effects in the
specific situation.
... [T]he broad language of the Act's definitions . . . leaves
no doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly, in doubtful
situations, by underlying economic facts rather than technically and
8
exclusively by previously established legal classification.
By 1946, the National Labor Relations Board had so successfully
shifted the balance of power in employer-employee relations that industrywide strikes threatened to cripple the national economy.9 During the first
week of the 1946 congressional session, more than 200 bills dealing with
labor relations were introduced,"0 and in 1947 Congress cut back the Act's
coverage with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.11 Even then, however, the
stated purpose was to avert industrial strife,'1 and the limitation on judicial
review of Board decisions remained."
8NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 322 U.S. 111, 126, 127, 129 (1944).

9 Note, Labor Law-The National Labor Relations Board Redefines and Restricts the Scope
of Managerial Employee Classification, 26 VAND. L. REV. 850, 852 (1973). See also, Reilly,
The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 285, 288 (1960-61);
Aaron, Amending the Taft-Hartley Act: A Decade of Frustration, 11 IND. & LAB. REL. REv.
327, 328 (1957-58).
10 ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAw, THE DEVELOPNNG LABOR LAw 35, 36-39, (Morris
ed. 1971). See also Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61
HARv. L. REv. 1, 48 (1948).
"1Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. § 141-97). See generally Reilly, supra note 9 and Aaron,
supra note 9. See also 23 NOTRE DAME LAw 238, 240-41 (1947-48).

A statement of the

official congressional findings appears at Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, (1947)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)). The revisions removed supervisors and independent
contractors from the Act's coverage but added a definition of "professional" employees,
making it clear an employee would not be denied coverage solely because he exercised
some independent judgment in his work. Pub. L. No. 80-101, §§ 2(3), 2(11), 2(12), 9(b);
61 Stat. 137-38, 143 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. H§ 152(3), 152(11), 152(12),
159(b) (1976).
312The Preamble of the 1947 Amendment still refers to "industrial strife" as the principal
evil to be avoided by the Act. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101 §
l(b), 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
13Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 10(e), 61 Stat. 148 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/2
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II.

NLRB

JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE

What courts have said about the authority of the National Labor Relations Board is in marked contrast to what they have done. This passage
from an early Supreme Court decision is typical of the deference expressed
for Board decisions:
Everyday experience in the administration of the statute gives it [the
Board] familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment relationships in various industries, with the abilities and
needs of the workers for self-organization and collective action, and
with the adaptability of collective bargaining for the peaceful settlement of their disputes with their employers.
[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad
statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the
statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is
limited. . . . [T]he Board's determination . . . is to be accepted if
it has "warrant in the record" and a reasonable basis in the law.14
But those same courts have been as quick to overrule Board decisions
as they have been to set out their reticence to do so.' 5 In the earliest cases,
this was primarily interference with the remedies ordered. Despite the
extremely broad remedial powers given the Board by the original Act, 6
the courts of appeals immediately began to restrict those powers and over14 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-131,
(1944). For similar language,
see, e.g., Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298 (1977); NLRB v. J. Weingarten,
Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); NLRB v.
Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87 (1957); NLRB v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); NLRB
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1968).
15This problem was recognized from the outset and shared with other administrative agencies. See Fraenkel, Judicial Interpretation of Labor Laws, 6 U. CM. L. REv. 577 (1938).
Fraenkel states that the finality given the Board's findings of fact "was given by Congress
in the belief that specialists are better able to reach a correct decision on the facts than
are reviewing judges. Yet the courts have thwarted Congressional will in a variety of
manners." id. at 593. According to Fraenkel, those manners include finding that an administrative agency cannot with finality pass on the facts necessary to establish its own
jurisdiction and finding a "lack of substantial evidence" (a term which first appeared in
ICC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 222 U.S. 541, 547 (1912) and came into common use with
Florida v. United States, 292 U.S. 1, 12 (1934) and its progeny).
l6The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging
in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce. This power shall
be exclusive, and shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention
that has been or may be established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise.
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 10(a) 49 Stat. 453 (1935)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976)). The Act goes on to give the Board power
"to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back
pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act." Id. § 10(c), 49 Stat. 454 (1935) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 160(2) (1976). As one early commentator noted, (see 1939 Wis. L.
R. 132, 133-34) this was a marked increase over even the powers delegated to the Federal
Trade Commission in the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L No. 63-203, 38
Stat. 717 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1976). The additional power, according
to the
House Report, was 1981
to enable the Board to adapt orders to the needs of the in'
Published
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turn Board-ordered remedies. In NLRB v. Carlisle Lumber Co.,"' the Ninth
Circuit declared that the Board's remedial powers were to be exercised
to protect only the public interest, not private interests, though individuals
might incidentally benefit from Board proceedings. In Remington Rand,
Inc. v. NLRB, 8 the Second Circuit added that the Board's powers were
9
remedial only and not punitive. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, the
Supreme Court reversed a Board order invalidating certain collective bargaining agreements found to have been formed under employer duress. The
°
Court concluded the evidence was not sufficient to establish coercion;"
hence the contracts were not such as would "thwart the purposes of the
Act." In reinstating the contracts, the Court thus ignored both the limitations
on a reviewing court's reversal of factual findings and the fact that the
Board was the body authorized to determine what remedies "will effectuate
the policies" of the Act."
This pattern of compliments to the Board, coupled with reversal of its
12
decisions, has continued steadily throughout the intervening years.
27 94 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1937).
1894 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938).
19305 U.S. 197 (1938).
201d. at 236.
21 See note 16, supra.
In NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 98 F.2d 97, 99 (1938), the Second Circuit again
22
interfered with a Board remedy, this time an order to a company not to employ a certain
individual "for the purpose of evading the obligations under the Act." By ignoring the
limited scope of the Board's order, which only prohibited employment of this individual
"for the purpose of evading the obligations under the Act," the court was able to characterize this as an issue of Board interference with the employer's right to choose its own representative. In fact, no such issue was even raised, but the sweeping pronouncements of
the Second Circuit undercut the Board's potential for deciding, in proper circumstances,
that the actions of a particular individual have been so repressive and have so tainted the
company's position that further employment of that individual would in and of itself inhibit the employees and their representatives.
In Mooresville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 94 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1938), and NLRB v.
A.S. Abell Co., 97 F.2d 951, 959 (4th Cir. 1938), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed NLRB orders to companies to post notice they would cease and desist from unlawful practices. In Abell, the court aggravated the injury by announcing that the purposes
of the Act would be fully met by a lesser remedy, thus succinctly usurping the Board's
statutory authority "to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of
this Act."
In Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 388 (7th Cir. 1938), the
Seventh Circuit set aside a Board order reinstating discharged workers, not only reversing
the Board's finding that the affected individuals were "employees," but also questioning the
Board's decision that their reinstatement effectuated the purpose of the Act.
In NLRB v. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co., 121 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1941) the court
of appeals reversed a Board finding of refusal to bargain despite substantial evidence supporting the Board's decision. Similarly, in Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 423
(10th Cir. 1944), the court of appeals rejected the Board's findings of interference, restraint
and coercion of employees despite a substantial amount of evidence supporting the charges;
and in Wayside Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1953), it was a finding of
employer domination and interference with the independent union that fell after court
review of disputed facts.
In NLRB v. Coats & Clark, Inc. 231 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1956), the court of appeals 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/2
agreed with the Board's finding that the employer had engaged in unfair labor practices,
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III.

YESHIVA UNIVERSITY

If judicial intrusion into decisions best made by the Board is so longstanding and pervasive, why single out Yeshiva for special attention? When
the Second Circuit decision was issued in July of 1978," it generated a
flurry of law review articles' that were critical of the opinion if not necessarily of the result. Why so much interest in one case?
In part, the Second Circuit decision commanded attention by virtue
of the sheer incongruity of the result. In finding "the full-time faculty" of
Yeshiva University to have managerial status, the court effectively stated
that, among the professionals at Yeshiva University, there is no rank and
file. There are no workers, no one to be managed, no one to be involved
in the age-old conflict of employer against employee. That, in turn, must
mean that there are no workers at Yeshiva "subject, as a matter of economic
fact, to the evils that statute [the NLRA] was designed to eradicate." 5 Yet
but rejected a related finding that an employee had been wrongfully discharged in violation
of section 8(a) (3). Again, the record contained substantial testimony in favor of the Board's
decision.
In NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), where the Board found the union's
activities to constitute failure to bargain collectively, the Supreme Court reversed the
Board's cease and desist order on the grounds that no specific restrictions on employee
actions appear in the Act.
In NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1968), the court
of appeals relieved the Board of its authority to decide at what point an individual's responsibilities take him over the line from employee to supervisor, and did so even after
reiterating the great deference to be given Board findings:
Inasmuch as infinite variations and gradations of authority can exist within any one
industrial complex and any drawing of the line between the personnel of management
and the rank and file workers may require some expertise in evaluating actual power
distributions which exist within an enterprise, the Board's findings relative thereto are
entitled to great weight.
Id. at 1172. It is almost as though the court feels it can make up for its failure to yield to
the statutory mandate by assuring the reader of its familiarity with that mandate.
In NLRB v. Scott Paper Co., 440 F.2d 625 (1st Cir. 1971), the First Circuit acted
in the same vein, holding, despite a Board decision to the contrary, that for purposes of
deciding whether individuals were supervisors, actions which had the effect of furthering
both the individual's interest and that of the company should be seen as taken in the
interest of the company. Note that in Scott the court does not question the standards used
by the Board for distinguishing between supervisors and employees, but rather concludes
that the facts there did not establish the requisite standards.
In NLRB v. Monroe Tube Co., 545 F.2d 1320 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit reversed a Board order to the employer to cease and desist from interference with the employees' decision to unionize. Though the Board had determined that a key instigator
was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, so that his coercive activities could be
imputed to the employer, the court brushed that determination aside, disregarding the
Board's right to have its factual determination upheld if supported by the evidence.
23NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978).
24 Bethel, Private University Professors and NLRB v. Yeshiva: The Second Circuit's Misconception of Shared Authority and Supervisory Status, 44 Mo. L. REv. 427 (1979);
Morrill, Are Faculty Members Scholars or Managers? The Yeshiva Case, 30 LAD. LJ. 754
(1979); Comment, The Supervisory Status of Private University Faculty Members Under
the NLRA: NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 43 ALB. I REv. 162 (1978); 28 CATH. U. L. REv.688
(1979); 47 FoRnr.M L Rav. 437 (1979); 13 GA. L REV. 313 (1978).
Published
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the Yeshiva University Faculty Association, an association chosen by a

"substantial margin" in a Board-conducted election, was to act as bargaining
agent for individuals who obviously felt themselves to be in need of a
formal bargaining agent and a written contract."6 Who was to tell them they
were already members of the hierarchy from which they had asked for

protection?
Beyond the incongruous result, Yeshiva was also of great general interest because of its potentially widespread impact on collective bargaining
at universities throughout the country. Though the Second Circuit carefully
explained that the decision dealt only with one university, one unique fact
situation,"1 its broad attack on the criteria used by the Board to evaluate
whether professionals at institutions of higher education are managerial called
that attempted limitation into question." How could the result be limited
to Yeshiva University when the opinion cut the foundation out of the prior
higher education cases?2 9
Despite the volume and eloquence of the attacks on the Second Circuit's
decision, the Supreme Court affirmed, 0 elaborating on, but in no significant way changing, the analysis. The Court found the full-time faculty members of Yeshiva University to be managerial employees excluded from the
coverage of the National Labor Relations Act, thereby affirming the Second
Circuit's refusal to enforce the Board-ordered bargaining. Yeshiva is the law
of the land; there will surely be much discussion about how thoroughly
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 689 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 696, 701, 703.
28
As a number of writers have noted, the court's rejection not just of the Board's factual
determination in this case but of the bases it has used to make that factual determination
clearly raises specters well beyond Yeshiva. There are many other universities where faculty
enjoy significant control over the same policy decisions found significant in both the Second
Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Yeshiva. See Bethel, supra note 24. See also 43
ALB. L. REv. 162, 183 (1978), noting that, if the Supreme Court is right, even a school
which always rejects faculty suggestions could still call the faculty managerial under
Yeshiva. The impact of Yeshiva is discussed further in the concluding sections of this article.
29 In rejecting the notion of collective versus individual action, the court undercut the
Board's holding in C.W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971) and
in Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971). In rejecting the "ultimate power of the
Board of Trustees" test, it undercut Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972), which in
part rested also on the individual versus collective distinction. Goddard College, 234 N.L.R.B.
1111 (1978); Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); Univ. of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B.
634 (1972); Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. 65 (1972); and New York Univ., 205
N.L.R.B. 4 (1973), all turned on those same criteria. In holding that faculty members'
interests are coextensive with those of the Board of Trustees, so that there can be no
meaningful inquiry into whether they act in the interest of themselves or of management,
the court threatened Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 227 N.L.R.B. 239 (1976), which in its
turn depended to some extent on the "ultimate power" doctrine. Finally, in rejecting the
notion that the faculty, as professionals, had been specifically included by the 1947 revisions and hence could not be considered outside the coverage of the Act, the court
called into question the soundness of the holding in NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d
550 (1st Cir. 1975).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/2
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collective bargaining in higher education has been decimated."'
To date, discussion of Yeshiva has, however, focused on the "rightness"
or "wrongness" of the decision. My concern is not with whether the Court
made the "right" decision, but with whether the Board's decision should
have been reassessed by the Court at all. That is, was the Court right to
review, criticize, and ultimately discard the Board's criteria for determining

managerial status?
IV.

THE MANAGERIAL EXCEPTION: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

To understand why it is particularly inappropriate for the Court to have
interfered with the Board's interpretation of the managerial exception, one
has to look back at the legislative history, or, more properly, the lack of
legislative history, concerning that exception.la There was no reference to a
B' Just after the Supreme Court decision in Yeshiva, the Wall Street Journal noted that a
dozen private colleges had broken off bargaining with organized professors and quoted "an
expert" who had once predicted 80% of the professors would join unions by 1985, but
had revised his estimate to 50% to 60% in the wake of Yeshiva. The article further noted
that the case might hurt public college organizing by retarding the spread of public-sector
bargaining laws. (Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1980). The National Education Association,
which represents professors at widespread public institutions of higher education and a
handful of private institutions, devoted the cover story of its April/May higher education
newsletter to Yeshiva. Though the point of the article was clearly to head off post-Yeshiva
panic, NEA's general counsel was quoted as saying that consideration had been given to
amending the National Labor Relations Act as an antidote to Yeshiva and that post-Yeshiva
strategy was being carefully coordinated with the American Association of University
Professors and the American Federation of Teachers, both of which represent professors at
various public and private institutions of higher education. (NEA Advocate, April/May
1980, 4-5).
8aa In enacting the 1947 amendments, Congress appears to have been, at least in part, reacting to Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), in which the Supreme Court
said supervisory employees were entitled to the rights guaranteed by the Act. In response
to Packard, Congress amended the definition of "employee" to include professionals but
to exclude supervisors and independent contractors. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3) and (12) (1976).
One writer observed:
The statutory exclusion of "supervisors" did not cover confidential or managerial employees. The legislative history indicated that Congress thought that the Board had
excluded confidential employees from the scope of the Act and would continue to do
so. The congressional debates never mentioned managerial employees, and their
status remained uncertain.
Carr, "Managerial Employee": A Label in Search of a Definition, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 435,
438 (1979). As authority for his assertion, the author cites H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 35, reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1135, 1141; Note, Will the
Real Managerial Employees Please Stand Up? 9 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 92, 101, 103 (1975),
and 24 CATH. U. L. Rav. 118, 121 (1974). For the proposition that managerial employees
were not discussed, the author cites: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF rHE LAB oR MANAGEMENT RELATIONs ACT 1947 (1948).
Later, the Supreme Court, viewing this history, made other assumptions about the 1947
reenactment that may have some relevance here. In Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., 416 U.S.
653 (1973), the Court had this to say about the addition of the supervisory exclusion:
This history compels the conclusion that Congress' dominant purpose in amending §§
2(3) and 2(11), and in enacting § 14(a) was to redress a perceived imbalance in
labor-management relationships that was found to arise from putting supervisors in
the position of serving two masters with opposed interests.,
(Emphasis added). 416 U.S. at 661-662.
PublishedInby IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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"managerial" exception in the National Labor Relations Act when it was enacted in 1935, nor has one been added since. Rather, the notion that such individuals should be excluded from the bargaining unit is one developed by the
Board in an attempt to further the purposes of the Act. To the extent there
may be said to be any "legislative history," that history is merely the reenactment, with amendments, of the NLRA as part of the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947. 3Unfortunately, the exception was still poorly defined as of 1947 and
such definition as existed may have little application today. During the
early part of the 1940's, the Board excluded supervisory, managerial, and
confidential employees from rank-and-file bargaining units. The implication
of the decisions, however, was that all these employees were protected by
the Act and free to form units of their own. Unfortunately that question
was not directly addressed during any proceedings. 33 This is an important
distinction, since it means that the Board, in determining which employees
were managerial, was apparently assuming that those employees, though
not grouped for bargaining purposes with the rank and file workers, would
over subjects of bargaining, noted that Congress in 1947 had resisted an attempt to list the
subjects of bargaining and had instead left the language general. The Court's conclusion
was that Congress intended thereby to leave the discretion to decide with the Board. At
the very least, it can be said that Congress, failing in 1947 to define "managerial" even
though that term had been raised by the cases, intended to leave that definition as well
to the Board. At best, one could argue that the specific incorporation in 1947 of "professionals" as covered employees shows that Congress wanted the Board to keep moving in
the direction of extending protection to a broad group of employees, even those with considerable discretionary authority.
Thus it should be the Board's decision to determine when to exclude managers as
supervisory. Whatever their level of authority, should not the root question be whether
giving them the protection of the Act will lead to service of two opposed masters?
Interestingly, there may be one further, albeit slim, clue to Congress' attitude toward
32
the Board's interpretation of "managerial," a clue particularly salient in cases involving
professional employees, as all sides concede the professors in Yeshiva to be. In its recent
extension of the National Labor Relations Act to nonprofit hospital employees, Congress resisted pressure specifically to exclude health care professionals from the definition of
supervisor, not because it desired to mandate their inclusion, but because of its confidence in the Board to decide such questions accurately on a case-by-case basis. In the
Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, the reporters praised
the Board's exercise of discretion in differentiating between "professional activities requiring direction of other employees and those truly reflective of supervisory status":
The Committee notes that the Board has carefully avoided applying the definition of
"supervisor" to a health care professional who gives direction to other employees in
the exercise of professional judgment, which direction is incidental to the professional's
treatment of patients, and thus is not the exercise of supervisory authority in the
interest of the employer.
The Committee expects the Board to continue evaluating the facts of each case in
this manner when making its determination.
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT HosPIrrALS UNDER
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, S. REP. No. 776, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
Why assume that the same Congress that is so pleased with the Board's case-by-case
adjudication on the question of supervisory status is not equally well satisfied with the

continuing case-by-case development of a workable definition of "managerial"?

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/2
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still enjoy the protections of the Act. To suggest that an employee is
either managerial or non-managerial, and that the definition should be
the same whether managerial employees are excluded altogether or simply
put in units of their own, is to miss one of the underlying tenets of the
Act, one identified by the Supreme Court itself: that the Act is to be interpreted "broadly in doubtful situations, by [reference to] underlying
economic facts, rather than technically and exclusively by previously established legal classifications,"3 and that "it cannot be irrelevant... [whether]
particular workers . . . are subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the
evils that statute was designed to eradicate."3 Thus it could well be that
the Board would have adopted a much narrower definition of "managerial,"
both prior to and following adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act, if it believed placement in that classification meant not merely separation from
other employees for bargaining purposes but exclusion from the protection
of the Act. Similarly, the "hands off" attitude Congress took toward the
managerial exception might have been altered if the Board had been
excluding all managerial employees from coverage.
How had the Board defined these so-called managerial employees prior
to 1947? The first case mentioning them appears to be Vulcan Corporation,"
where in 1944 a timber cruiser log buyer was excluded from a rank-and-file
unit not because he supervised anyone but because the responsibility of
his position and his peculiar relationship with management was thought
to give him interests different from those of other employees. In 1943
and 1944, the Board had excluded expediters from proposed units, in the
first case because they were "closely related to management," "' and in the
second because their "authority . . . to exercise their discretion in making
commitments on behalf of the Company stamps them as managerial."" By
1946, in Ford Motor Company,39 the Board was excluding "executive employees who are in a position to formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies."4 " This definition evolved over the years, emerging in Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp.,"1 after enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act,
as those who "formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing
and making operative the decisions of their employers." 2 In that same case,
the Board noted that store managers would not be viewed as managerial
34 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 322

U.S.

111,

129

(1944).

S5 Id. at 127.
3658 N.L.R.B. 733, 15 L.R.R.M. 66 (1944).
37 Julien P. Friez & Sons, 47 N.L.R.B. 43, 11 L.R.R.M. 229 (1943).

Spicer Mfg. Co., 55 N.LR.B. 1491, 14 L.R.R.M. 112 (1944).
39 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 17 L.R.R.M. 394 (1946).
4Old. at 1322, 17 L.R.R.M. at 395.
38

4 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 21 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1947).
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unless "their interests are identified with management rather than with employees. 4 3
Even after enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, which specifically excluded "supervisors" from the Act's coverage, the Board vacillated on
whether those classified as managerial, rather than supervisory, were excluded or simply required to form separate units." That question culminated
in Bell Aerospace Co.,4 1 where the Board succinctly stated that managerial
employees who did not fall within one of the other exclusions would not
be deprived of the Act's protection unless they were involved in the formulation or implementation of labor relations policies. The effect of the Board's
decision was to avoid joining, for bargaining purposes, those who lacked
a community of interest, to allow management the allegiance of employees
actually assisting it in its disputes with bargaining units, and yet to preserve
a liberal construction of the Act to protect, as nearly as feasible, all those
subject to the "evils the statute was designed to eradicate."
With the Supreme Court's reversal of Bell Aerospace' came a new
urgency to distinguish between managerial and non-managerial employees.
Now, to call an employee managerial was to leave him with only such bargaining power as his own individual expertise and usefulness to the company
might exact. He would be stripped of the protections of the Act and consequently of the right to band together with his peers for bargaining purposes.
During the same period, the Board was being asked to distinguish,
in an increasing number of cases, between managerial and "professional"
employees. Since the 1947 amendments had expressly included "professional" employees among those covered by the Act," it was apparent that some
-Id. at 323, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1039.
Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753-54, 37 L.R.R.M. 1391, 1393 (1956), the Board
held that managerial employees were outside the scope of the Act. Yet in North Ark.
Elec. Coop., Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550, 75 L.R.R.M. 1068, enforcement denied, 446 F.2d 602
(8th Cir. 1971), the Board held that managerial employees did have a right to representation unless a legitimate reason for denying them representation could be advanced. Throughout this period, the circuit courts were generally accepting the Board policy of excluding
managerial employees from rank-and-file bargaining units. Whether the circuit courts considered such employees covered was less clear, though there was dictum in some cases suggesting
that managerial employees were not protected at all. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Illinois State
Journal Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1969); Retail Clerks Int'l. Ass'n. v.
NLRB, 366 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
45 196 N.L.R.B. 827, 80 L.R.R.M. 1099 (1972).
46NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
47 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976) "Professional Employee" as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of
such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged 10
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/2
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
44In
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individuals whose work involved the exercise of discretion and judgment
were nevertheless covered by the Act. The Board saw itself as forced
to distinguish between true managerial employees and those who "routinely
made competent professional and administrative [decisions] in the ordinary
course of their employment.""8 The conclusion it reached was that, in view
of the Act's history and the more than three decades of Board and court
decisions, "managerial status is not conferred upon rank-and-file workers,
or upon those who perform routinely, but rather is reserved for those in
executive-type positions, those who are closely aligned with management
as true representatives of management." 9 Inherent in that conclusion are
at least three assumptions about managerial employees: first, that they are
distinguishable from the rank and fie; second, that they are closely aligned
with management; and third, that they represent management to someone.'
To understand why the Board would make such assumptions, we
must go back to the rationale behind the Board's definition of managerial
employee that was accepted by the Supreme Court in Bell Aerospace: "one
who is formulating, determining and effectuating his employer's policies
or has discretion, independent of an employer's established policy, in the
performance of his duties."'" What courts, including the Supreme Court,
have failed to keep in mind is that the formula is Board-devised, developed
in an attempt to secure what may be called the underlying purposes of the
Act, and good only so long as it produces results consistent with those purposes. Those purposes are to protect the rank-and-fie unions from managerial
control and to ensure that management has the loyalty of those in a posilearning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an
apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical
processes; or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv)

of paragraph (a), and (ii)

is performing

related work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
48General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857, 87 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1715 (1974).
49 ld.
5oGeneral Dynamics is especially interesting when considered in connection with Yeshiva,

since in that case, as in Yeshiva, the alleged supervisory/managerial employees really had
no one to manage except their peers. The Board said in considering whether the senior
engineers were supervisors:
In our view, true supervisorial authority is not vested in the senior engineering and

administrative employees vis-a-vis the nonsenior employees in their work groups, nor is
it vested in themselves as equals who, for indeterminate periods of time, "supervise" coequals who, in turn, later "supervise" their equals while simultaneously being "supervised" by their coequals.

Id. at 859, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1715. Yet that is precisely the situation that is used in Yeshiva
to justify categorizing the faculty as managerial. While there is presumably some basis for
distinction between supervisory and managerial status, nothing in the history of Board
or court decisions gives a clear idea of what that is. General Dynamics raises the question:
Representing management's interests to whom?
61416byU.S.
267, 273 (1974). 1981
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tion to effectuate policy. 2 Thus, there can be no significant discussion of a
"managerial" distinction if there is no rank and file to protect. 3 Neither
is there any reason to worry about managerial control of the rank-and-file
unions unless those alleged to be exercising control are closely aligned with
management, nor need management worry about the "loyalty" of those
effectuating policy unless they effectuate policy in the name of management,
that is, unless they act as management's representatives to some other person
or entity.
To adhere to the formula and lose the spirit of the Act is the worst
kind of formalism, and the Board has long resisted rule-making which might
lock in formulas." As one writer has said:
The indicia of managerial alignment . . . vary according to the type
of employee and authority structure under consideration. The professional or artistic employee's influence on company policy does not
necessarily reflect managerial authority. A member of lower-level management might not be primarily aligned with the employer in a large
corporation. Thus . . . the Board has found it necessary to make
case-by-case determinations regarding managerial status and has been
unable to articulate any firm rules applicable to the various types of
employees who seek to exercise bargaining rights. 5
There were, then, at least two areas where the Board had difficulty drawing
the line between managerial and non-managerial employees: professional
employees" and those who might be considered, at most, lower-level management. The trek into what the Board has called the "uncharted area"57
of higher education has brought both areas quickly and decisively into the
foreground of decisionmaking.
52See 43 ALB. L. REV. 162, 164 n. 12 (1978)

for a discussion of the two purposes and for

the legislative history behind them.
5 As the Board said in Westinghouse Electric Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 337, 340, 36 L.R.R.M.

1294, 1295 (1955):

To justify the exclusion of individuals otherwise qualified for inclusion in a professional unit upon the ground that they are too closely allied to the Employer to be
regarded as employees under the Act, we believe it must be established that the individuals have interests and duties not shared by the other professionally engaged employees.
54 See Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policy-making Through
Adjudication, 21 UCLA L. REV. 63 (1973). See also: Menard & DeGiovanni, NLRB Jurisdiction Over Colleges and Universities: A Plea for Rulemaking, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv.

599 (1975). Shortly after the Board asserted jurisdiction over higher education, the American
Association of University Professors petitioned for rulemaking. Petition to the NLRB for Proceedings for Rule-making in Representation Cases Involving Faculty Members in Colleges and
Universities, June 18, 1971. See also the First Circuit's suggestion that some of the problems

arising in higher education cases might best be handled by rule-making. Trustees of Boston
Univ. v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1978).
Carr, supra note 31, at 435.
- NLRB coverage of professionals has posed problems generally, not just in higher educa55

tion. See id. at 441-52, where the author summarizes the dilemma posed by attorneys, engineers, hospital personnel, and faculty.
57C.W. Post Center of Long Island Univ. 189 N.L.R.B. 964, 905, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1003
(1971).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/2
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UNIVERSITY CASES

Though the Board first asserted authority over a university in Cornell
University" in 1970, it was not until C. W. Post Center of Long Island University59 in 1971 that a faculty unit was involved. There followed a series of
faculty cases,"0 in the course of which the Board concluded:
[T]he industrial model cannot be imposed blindly on the academic
world as though there were a one-to-one relationship. The basic interests recognized by the Act remain the same, but their interrelationships, the employer-employee relationship . . . does not squarely fit
the industrial model. . . Rarely, if ever, does industry present a
situation where employee interests outside the economic sphere assume
major importance.
For that reason we are forced to conclude that reliance on industrial models alone is not appropriate and cannot serve all the
legitimate interests of employees in what, until recently, was terra incognita for the Act and for the Board."'
The search for a model that would be "appropriate and . . . serve
all the legitimate interests of employees" eventually led the Board to develop
four criteria for determining which faculty members would be employees,
rather than managers, for purposes of the Act:
1) Is the individual a "professional" within the section 152(12)
definition?
2) To the extent that he exercises authority which in other contexts
might be considered managerial, does he exercise that authority
collectively with his peers rather than individually?
3) Does he, in exerting that authority, act in his own interest rather
than that of management?
4) Are his decisions subject to reversal by a higher authority?"
Affirmative answers were indices that an employee was rank and file, rather
than managerial. They were not substitutes for the definition approved
in Bell Aerospace, but rather touchstones to guide the court in deciding,
within the university context, which employees fell outside that definition.
5s 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970).
59 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1971).
60 It would serve no purpose to cite all the higher education cases. Typical and frequently
cited are: Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 89 L.R.R.M. 1862 (1975); Univ. of
Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634, 87 L.R.R.M. 1634 (1974); Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 83
L.R.R.M. 1373 (1973); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 78 L.R.R.M. 1397 (1971).
61 Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 643, 83 L.R.R.M. 1373, 1375-76 (1973).
62

The development of these criteria has been traced in a number of articles and does not

bear repeating here. See 28 CATH. U. L. REv. 663 (1979); 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 437
(1978);
13 GA. L. REV. 3131981
(1978).
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The Yeshiva Court and legal commentators have criticized the Board
for its failure to cite "authority" for the derivation of these criteria,"
but the criticisms are ill-founded. The authority for the criteria is the Act's
mandate to avert "industrial strife and unrest"6 and the long-established
right of the board to construe the Act liberally so as to accomplish that
end. 5 Indeed, no other authority is possible. No managerial definition appears in the Act, nor were there any higher education cases prior to the
1970's. If the Board is justified in insisting upon a case-by-case determination as to which employees are managerial, and no court has yet denied
it that right in spite of frequent cries for the rule-making,6" then there is
no controlling authority beyond the Act itself. 7 This is not to say there
is no such thing as precedent in determining which employees are managerial, but rather that the usefulness of any one decision is narrowly limited by
its applicability only to closely-related fact situations in similar hierarchical
models. 8 Formulas, while useful in a proper context, have to be avoided
e3 444 U.S. 672, 684 (1980); 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 442 (1979); 13 GA. L. REV. 313,
316 (1978).
64 See notes 5 and 12, supra.
65 See the material from NLRB v. Hearst Publications Inc. quoted in the text accompanying
note 8, supra. For an interesting postulation as to how the criteria were derived, see 43 ALB.
L. REV. 162, 167-68 (1978).
66 See note 54, supra.
67 Indeed, though the Court in Yeshiva is critical of the Board for its failure to cite authority,

the authority the Court cites is of questionable relevance. Citations to other court decisions are
of little help, since it is the Board and not the courts that has been entrusted with authority
to define "managerial". The Court expressly acknowledged definition to be a Board responsibility in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974). Citation to earlier
Board decisions for formulae implemented in different factual situations and in different
industries is also of little help. In addition, the denial of managerial status on the basis
of actual power to influence company policy would leave the Act applicable "solely to
the most powerless and uninfluential employees." Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education,
5 U. TOL. L. REv. 608, 617 (1974).
The Finkin article suggests a number of troublesome questions about distinguishing
managerial from non-managerial employees. Should need for a union ever be a factor? Is it
an individual's basic job that must be considered in weighing his status, or may we consider
the trappings of power developed as adjuncts to that job? Where an institution has a
well-developed committee system exerting substantial influence on the direction of the
institution, are we to assume that committee policy necessarily equals managerial policy?
Is institutional policy the same thing as managerial policy, or is it possible in a given
instance that employee policy may, through dint of collective strength, displace managerial
policy?
The Court owes an explanation as to the specific basis for its rejection of the Board's
factual finding, since a defensible construction of the statute may not be rejected merely
because the Court might prefer another view. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497
(1979).
68 Indeed, even the Court acknowledges that the Act was drawn for and is best suited
for the typical pyramidical hierarchies of private industry, not the decentralized authority
structure of the typical university. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680 (1980).
See Baldridge, Powmt AND CONFLICT IN THE UNivRsrry 114 (1971) for a discussion of
these contrasting structures. As another writer has noted, while the faculty is the production
force in higher education, it is not really the floor of the pyramid, as are the rank and file
in industry. Thus the production force, or rank and file, in higher education has considerable shared authority. Bethel, supra note 24, at 429.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/2
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where their effect is to lead the Board (or the court) away from the under69
lying purposes of the Act.
While the decision whether a particular employee is "managerial"
is one of fact, applying an undefined term to varying factual situations
necessarily raises a mixed problem of fact and law as a definition is hammered out. When the Court, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, approved the
Board's two-part definition of managerial,"0 it greatly reduced the "legal"
component in any decision as to managerial status of an employee. The
problem became one of answering a few factual inquiries:
Does the employee formulate, determine or effectuate policy? Does
he do so on behalf of his employer, rather than in his own interest?
Does he have discretion in the performance of his duties? If so, is
that discretion independent of his employer's established policy?
In Yeshiva, it was undisputed that the faculty formulated policies and
exercised discretion in the performance of its duties. The Board had only
to decide whether it formulated policies on behalf of its employer, rather
than in its own interest, and whether its discretion in the exercise of its
duties extended beyond established policy.
Admittedly, determining whether the faculty formulates policy in its
own interest or that of the university is a thorny problem. That problem is
compounded when one confuses the question of policy formation with
that of discretion in the performance of duty. In Yeshiva, the Court, while
puzzling over the question of policy formulation, says:
It may appear, as the Board contends, that the professor performing governance functions is less "accountable" for departures
from the institutional policy than a middle-level industrial manager
whose discretion is more confined. Moreover, traditional systems of
collegiality and tenure insulate the professor from some of the sanctions applied to an industrial manager who fails to adhere to company
policy."'
It is one thing to be given a role in formulating the institution's policies;
69
Neither can it be said that the Board is straining the Bell Aerospace formula to include
a greater and greater number of professionals under the Act. In fact, its treatment of management trainees demonstrates that the Board is sensitive to the spirit of the statute, even where
that spirit mandates exclusion of one who might otherwise appear to be outside the ambit of
the Bell Aerospace test. Trainees do not formulate and effectuate management policies, nor
do they exercise discretion independent of the employer's established policy. Yet the Board
has excluded them from coverage, reasoning that their attitudes will be influenced by their
ultimate goal. One who hopes upon completion of a program to be accepted into management will, as the Board recognizes, necessarily be inclined to align himself with management even before he assumes the responsibilities that will bring him literally within the
traditional definition. It would, for instance, be in his interest to win favor with management
at the expense of his fellow employees, and hence exclusion of him from coverage is in
line with the goal of protecting union activities from the influence of management representatives. Curtin Noll Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. 1447, 89 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1975).
70416 U.S. 267, 273 (1974).
71444 U.S. 672, 689 (1980).
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it is quite another to be allowed the discretion, in one's own judgment in
the exercise of one's responsibilities, to deviate from those policies when
that course seems best. While it appears that either honor would qualify
an employee as managerial under the Bell Aerospace definition, the Court's
failure to differentiate the issues is symptomatic of its limited grasp of the
very definition it purports to apply.
In rejecting the Board's conclusion that the faculty formulates policy
in its own interest, the Court complains, "[T]he Board assumes that the
professional interests of the faculty and the interests of the institution are
distinct, separable entities with which a faculty member could not simultaneously be aligned."72 While it may be true that the evidence the Board
had in support of that proposition was thin, the Court goes on to draw its
own conclusion without reference to any evidence at all: "In fact, the
faculty's professional interests-as applied to governance at a university like
Yeshiva--cannot be separated from those of the institution." 3 Since the
issue is one of fact, surely the Court should discuss the evidence on which
it bases its conclusion;" its use of the phrase "at a university like Yeshiva"
suggests it is overturning a Board determination as to fact, not on the basis of
the record at all, but rather on the basis of some generalized notion it has
of how universities operate. On the question of whether the faculty exercises
discretion in the performance of its responsibilities independent of institutional policy, there is no discussion at all.
Though the Court long ago conceded that the Board has power to
adapt its interpretation of the Act to changing conditions," Yeshiva turns
precisely on a refusal by the Court to allow just that latitude. "The controlling consideration in this case," says the Court, "is that the faculty of
Yeshiva University exercise authority which in any other context unquestionably would be managerial. ' 76 As a number of commentators have noted,
the problem is precisely that the faculty of an institution of higher education does not operate in "any other context." The university's hierarchical
72

Id. at 688.

78Id.

Whether the interests of any two parties are distinguishable is a question of fact. The
"substantial margin" of professionals who chose to bargain in an adversary relationship
with the Board of Trustees is itself testimony to a divergence of interests. Finkin suggests
that the combination of a favorable labor market and strongly-held employee preferences
led to the creation of the powerful committee system that characterizes higher education
generally and Yeshiva University particularly. Finkin, supra note 67, at 640.
75 The use by an administrative agency of an evolutional approach is particularly fitting
... . The responsibility to adapt the Act to changing patterns of industrial life is
entrusted to the Board . . . . [Tihe Board's construction here, while it may not be
required by the Act, is at least permissible under it, and insofar as the Board's application of that meaning engages in the "difficult and delicate responsibility" of reconciling
conflicting interests of labor and management, the balance struck by the Board is subject to limited judicial review.
NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266-67 (1975).
76 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/2
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structure is unique in the Board's experience, and the authority exercised
by faculty can be evaluated only by reference to the world in which the
faculty actually operates. 7 Whether the Board's decision is correct, even
given the context in which it had to be made, may remain a subject of
debate, but the Court's reversal of the Board on the grounds that its
tests for managerial authority within the university were not those used
for managerial authority in other contexts is indefensible.
VI. THE AFTERMATH
The irony of Yeshiva is that it threatens collective bargaining at private
universities at precisely the moment when the faculty is most in need of the
protections of the Act. Declining enrollments, a fall-off in contributions
to American colleges and universities, accelerating voter resentment toward
public spending, and the glut of teachers on the market have combined to
impede an individual professional's ability to bargain successfully."8 Educators today are in fact subject to the evils the Act was designed to eradicate.
In a glutted job market, individual bargaining is a sham.79 Faculty salaries
have declined, not only in the sense that all income has declined in real
value because of inflation, but by comparison with other workers." At
Yeshiva University itself, the faculty has experienced an increased teaching
load, diminished sabbaticals, a lower retirement age, postponed tenure
decisions, more part-time personnel, the closing of a graduate school, and the
cancelling of courses considered cost-inefficient.81 The Court's refusal to
consider the faculty's actual impotence to bargain individually reveals a
substantial disregard for the purpose of the Act.
7 The Court notes, "Only if an employee's activities fall outside the scope of the duties
routinely performed by similarly situated professionals will he be found aligned with
management." Id. at 690. The Board presumably agrees with that assertion. The only
difficulty is deciding which professionals are "similarly situated." The Court chooses to
compare faculty to middle-level industrial management; the Board appears to compare
them either to professionals at other institutions of higher education, or perhaps only to
other professionals at Yeshiva University. Given the unique hierarchical system of higher
education, there is a legitimate question, which the Court largely ignores, whether professionals in any other line are "similarly situated." See 43 ALB. L. REv. 162 (1978) for a
discussion of the two-tiered decision-making structure of universities. The author suggests
that there are two distinguishable varieties of authority within a typical university, one of
which may be characterized as "recommendatory authority over matters of professional
academic concern" and the other as "formal bureaucratic authority."
,s28 CATH. U. L. REV. 663, 705 (1979).
79 In 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 435, 452 (1979)
the author notes that Yeshiva may have the effect
of excluding faculty from NLRA protections at a time when the real power in universities
increasingly is shifting from faculty to the administration. In support of that proposition,
the author quotes from the New York Times:
The oversupply of Ph.D.'s has led institutions to treat young faculty members as
potentially expensive commodities useful economically at the lower salary levels but
better gotten rid of as they approach tenure and the time of significant pay increases.
O'Brien, A Generation of "Lost" Scholars, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1979, sec. 6 (Magazine)
at 35, 58.
60 28 CATH. U. L. REV. 663, 705 (1979).
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Whether anything is left of faculty bargaining in the wake of Yeshiva
remains to be seen. The Court's rejection of the idea that collective decisionmaking ought not be viewed as managerial leaves virtually every faculty
exposed to exclusion from coverage, since it is a rare university where
decisions as to curriculum, hiring, firing, and promotion are not effectively
made by departmental or university-wide committees composed largely or
entirely of faculty. 2
Having rejected the Board's touchstones for evaluating authority without proffering any of its own, the Court has done much to interject confusion into the question of faculty bargaining, and little to ensure that the
purposes of the Act are advanced. Ideally, the criticism directed at Yeshiva
would lead the Court to rethink its interference with the Board and leave
future cases to that body's resolution. To hope for such restraint, however,
is to ignore forty years' experience with just such judicial interference. In one
of the earliest articles about the National Labor Relations Act, Osmond
Fraenkel observed:
Yet it remains inevitable that there should be judges who set
themselves up as society's mentors and consider themselves entitled
to determine what shall be legal and to pronounce what they believe
wise. These men, with the most conscientious motives, destroy statutes
either by declaring them unconstitutional as against "natural law," or
by emasculating them through interpretation when higher authority
has barred the other way. Since they exemplify a persistent type of
human thinking and feeling, and since judges are seldom chosen for
their psychological qualities, it is foolish to hope that we shall ever
be without them.8"
History appears to have vindicated Fraenkel; whether we will ever
be without such judges remains to be seen, but Yeshiva is ample evidence
they are with us yet.
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